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Abstract
We investigate the representation of game-theoretic measures of net-
work centrality using a framework that blends a social network represen-
tation with the succint formalism of cooperative skill games. We discuss
the expressiveness of the new framework and highlight some of its ad-
vantages, including a fixed-parameter tractability result for computing
centrality measures under such representations. As an application we in-
troduce new network centrality measures that capture the extent to which
neighbors of a certain node can help it complete relevant tasks.
1 Introduction
Measures of network centrality have a long and rich history in the social sciences
[1] and Artificial Intelligence. Such measures have proved useful for a variety of
tasks, such as identifying spreading nodes [2] and gatekeepers for information
dissemination [3], advertising in multiagent markets [4], finding important nodes
in terrorist networks [5, 6]. Recent work has demonstrated that the use of
coalitional game-theoretic versions of centrality measures is especially beneficial
[7, 8], and has motivated the study of other topics, such as the extension of
centrality measures to more realistic settings [9], or the study of (frontiers of)
tractability of such measures [10, 11, 12].
The starting point of this paper is the observation that, while motivations
for studying many social network concepts (centrality measures in particular)
are often stated informally in terms of capabilities that nodes may possess,
capabilities that could help in performing certain actions, the actual definitions
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of such measures do not usually make explicit the different capabilities agent
have for acting.
To give just a famous example: Granovetter’s celebrated paper on the
strength of weak ties [13] considers edges adjacent to a given node by their
frequency of interaction. It argues that so-called weak ties (i.e. to those agents
only interacting with the given node occasionally) are especially important.
Such nodes may be capable to tell v about a certain job j, that v itself
does not know about. The bolded statement may be seen, of course, as
specifying a task tell[j], that weak tie neighbors of v may be able to complete
as a consequence of their network position.
The purpose of this paper is to study representational frameworks
for network centrality that explicitly take into account the acting
capabilities of various nodes. We follow [14] in advocating the study of
network centrality measures from a coalitional game-theoretic perspective. Our
concerns are somewhat different: whereas [14] mostly investigated representa-
tions of centrality measures from an axiomatic perspective, we study the use
of succint coalitional representation frameworks [15, 16, 17, 18, 19] for such
representations. The precise framework we investigate blends a network-based
specification G = (V,E) of the agent system and the so-called coalitional skill
games [19], that informally endow agents with skills that may prove instru-
mental in completing certain tasks, and get profit from completing them. A
centrality measure arises as an indicator (often the Shapley value) of the “im-
portance” of the agent in the associated coalitional game, measuring the extent
to which the agent helps coalitions profit from completing tasks.
The following is an outline of the (main results of the) paper: we prove
(Theorem 1) that our representations are universal: all centrality measures have
an equivalent CSG representation. We then identify some limits of this result by
identifying a natural property (rationality) that subsumes CSG representations
with constant coefficients but not the natural eigenvector centrality measure
(Theorem 5). Next we highlight a benefit of CSG representations, in the form
of a fixed parameter tractability result (Theorem 6). Also as an application of
our framework, we define two new centrality measures which aim to measure
the extent to which an agent can enlist its neighbors to help it complete a set
of tasks. These measures extend some important concepts such as the original
game-theoretic network centrality [2]. We show that our helping measures have
tractable explicit formulas for some special CSGs. We then study (with limited
success) the problem of axiomatic characterizations of helping centralities. The
paper concludes with brief discussions and open problems.
For sketches of the missing proofs we refer the reader to the Supplemental
Material.
2 Preliminaries and Notations
We will use (and review below) notions from several areas:
Theory of multisets. A multiset is a generalization of a set in which each
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element appears with a non-negative multiplicity. The union of two multisets
A,B, also denoted A∪B, contains those elements that appear in A,B, or both.
The multiplicity of such an element in A ∪B is the sum of multiplicities of the
element into A,B. Given multisets A,B, we write A ⊂ B iff every element with
positive multiplicity in A has at least as high a multiplicity in B.
Coalitional game theory. We assume familiarity with the basics of Coali-
tional Game Theory (see [20] for a recent readable introduction). For concrete-
ness we review some definitions:
A coalitional game is specified by a pair Γ = (N, v) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
is a set of players, and v is a function v : 2N → R, called characteristic function,
which satisfies v(∅) = 0. We will often specify a game by the characteristic
function only (since N is implicitly assumed in its definition). Also, denote
by Γ(N) the set of all coalitional games on N . Given integer 0 ≤ k ≤ n, we
denote by Ck(Γ) the set of coalitions of Γ (i.e. subsets of N) having cardinality
exactly k, and let C(Γ) be the union of all sets Ck(Γ). A game is monotonically
increasing if v is monotonically increasing with respect to inclusion.
We can represent any game on set N as a linear combination of veto games:
given ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , the S-veto game on N is the game with characteristic function
vS(T ) =
{
1, if S ⊂ T,
0, if otherwise.
Indeed, it is well-known [21] (and easy to prove) that the set of veto games (vS)
forms a basis for the linear space of coalitional games on N . Coefficients aS in
the decomposition v =
∑
S aSvS are called Harsanyi’s dividends. We will use
solution concepts associated to coalitional games, notably the Shapley value.
This index tallies the fraction of the value v(N) of the grand coalition that a
given player x ∈ N could fairly request. It has the formula [20] Sh[v](x) =
1
n! ·
∑
pi∈Sn [v(S
x
pi ∪ {x}) − v(Sxpi)], where Sxpi = {pi[i]|pi[i] precedes x in pi}. On
the other hand, if v(S) =
∑
S aSvS is the veto game decomposition of v then
for every i ∈ N we have
Sh[v](i) =
∑
i∈S
aS
|S| (1)
We also need to review several particular classes of coalitional games. A
(weighted) dummy game is a triple Γ = (N,w, v) where w : N → [0,∞) is a
weight function and the characteristic function has the form v(S) =
∑
i∈S w(i).
A cooperative skill game (CSG) [19, 22] is a 4-tuple Γ = (N,Sk, T, v), where
N is a set of players, Sk is a set of skills, T is a set of tasks, and v is a
characteristic function. We assume that each player x ∈ N is endowed with a
set of skills Skx ⊆ Sk. We extend this notation from players to coalitions by
denoting, for every S ⊂ N , SkS := ∪x∈SSkx. On the other hand, each task
t ∈ T is identified with a set of skills Tt ⊆ Sk, the set of skills needed to complete
task Tt. Finally, each task Tt has a profit wt ≥ 0. The value of a coalition S ⊂ N
is defined as v(S) =
∑
t∈T :Tt⊆SkS
wt. In other words: the value of a coalition S is
the sum of profits of all tasks that require only skills possessed by members of S.
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We will actually slightly extend the framework from [19, 22] by requiring that
tasks are multisets (rather than sets) of skills. Skillsets are still required to
be ordinary sets, but the condition Tt ⊆ SkS is now considered as a multiset
inclusion. A justification for this extension is given by the following example:
Example 1. We build upon a scenario from [6] based on the 9/11 terrorist
network initially reconstructed in [23]. In addition to ordinary nodes (displayed
as white circles), some nodes are endowed with one of two skills: M (”martial
arts”, displayed as yellow squares), P (”pilot”, displayed as grey diamonds)
(see Figure 1 (a)). A coalition of nodes could execute a hijacking attack iff it
contains at least two agents with capability M and one agent with capability
P . This description maps easily onto an (extended) CSG with a single task,
specified as the multiset of skills {M,M,P}, with profit 1, i.e. a coalition is
winning iff it contains at least two M members and at least one P member.1
We will denote by P (s) the set of players having a certain skill s.
Semivalues [27] generalize the well-known concepts of Shapley and Banzhaf
index. Given coalitional game Γ and C ∈ C(Γ), denote by MC(C, i) :=
v(C ∪ {i}) − v(C) the marginal contribution of player i to coalition C. Con-
sider a function β : {0, . . . , n − 1} → [0, 1] satisfying ∑n−1i=0 β(k) = 1. Given
semivalue β, the semivalue φi(v) for player i in cooperative game v is φi(v) =∑n−1
k=0 β(k) ·EC∈Ck [MC(C, i)]. For βSh(k) = 1/n we recover the Shapley value.
When βBan(k) = 12n−1
(
n−1
i
)
we obtain the Banzhaf index. Another important
case is the trivial semivalue βtriv(0) = 1, βtriv(i) = 0 otherwise. Finally, family
of semivalues β = (βn) is called polynomial time computable if the two-argument
function (n, k)→ (βn)k has this complexity.
We note the following very simple result:
Lemma 1. If Γ = (N,w, v) is a weighted dummy game and β is a semivalue
then for every i ∈ N , φi(v) = w(i).
Graph Theory and Network Centralities. A graph is a pair G = (V,E)
with V a set of vertices and E a set of edges. The degree of v, deg(v) is the
number of nodes v is connected to by edges. We will use ∆ to denote the
maximum degree of a node in V . If v ∈ V is a vertex we will denote by N(v)
the set of neighbors of v in G and by Nˆ(v) = N(v) ∪ {v}. We extend these
definitions to sets S ⊆ V by N(S) = {z | ∃w ∈ S, (z, w) ∈ E}.
We will denote by GV the set of all graphs on the vertex set V . A centrality
index is a function, c : GV → RV that assigns to every node v ∈ V a real
number, called the centrality of v quantifying the importance of node v in G.
We will denote by CV the set of all centrality measures on the set V . We will
usually drop V from our notation and write G, C, . . . instead of GV , CV and so
forth.
1For ease of exposition/computation we leave out from the specification of our example
a condition which was crucial in [6], that an attacking coalition be connected, i.e. that the
CSG game is a connectivity game [24] or a Myerson game [25]. With additional technical
complications along the lines of [26] one can probably incorporate this condition into our
example as well.
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Figure 1: The 9/11 WTC attack social nework (after [23], with skills assigned
by [6]).
We will use several concrete measures of centrality. The following is a listing
of some of them:
- degree centrality of node v in graph G is defined by cD(v,G) = |{(v, u) ∈
E|u ∈ E}|.
- betweenness centrality of node v in graph G is defined as follows: given
two distinct nodes z1, z2 ∈ V , denote by p(z1, z2) the number of shortest
paths in G between z1 and z2, and by p(z1, z2, v) the number of shortest
paths passing through v. Now we can define betweenness centrality as
cclose(v,G) =
∑
z1 6=z2∈V
p(z1,z2,v)
p(z1,z2)
.
- game-theoretic network centrality of node x in graph G is defined as the
Shapley value of x in game Γ with characteristic function v∗(S) = |S ∪
N(S)|.
- the eigenvector centrality of node v in graph G is defined as the v’th
component of the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the
adjacency matrix of G.
Coalitional Network Centralities. Following [14], a representation function
is a function ψ mapping every graph G = (V,E) onto a cooperative game ΓG
whose players are the vertices of G, ΓG = (V, vG). We will call a representation
w skill-based if for every graph G, the associated game ΓG is a CSG. A coalitional
centrality measure is a pair (ψ, φ), where ψ is a representing function and φ is a
solution concept. A skill-based centrality measure is one for which representation
ψ is skill-based. Given semivalue β, a β-skill-based centrality measure is a pair
(ψ, φ) where ψ is a skill-based and φ is the semivalue induced by β. A skill-based
centrality measure is trivial iff the solution concept φ is simply the value function
of the CSG associated to graph G by φ. Note that for weighted dummy games
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this is equivalent to requiring that φ is the semivalue induced by the trivial
semivalue βtriv.
Parameterized Complexity. A parameterized problem is specified by a set of
pairs W ⊆ Σ∗×N and a function f : A→ N. Problem (W, f) is fixed-parameter
tractable if there exists a computable function g : N → N, an integer r > 0
and an algorithm A that computes f(z) on inputs z = (x, k) from W in time
O(g(k) · |x|r).
3 Universality of Skill-Based Centralities.
[14] have shown that any centrality measure is equivalent to a coalitional cen-
trality measure. We make this result slightly more precise: the cooperative
game can be taken to be a CSG and the solution concept can be induced by
any arbitrary semivalue:
Theorem 1. For every semivalue β and every centrality c ∈ C there exists an
equivalent β-skill-based representation.
Proof. Let c ∈ C be a centrality measure on graph G. Consider the dummy
game in which v(S) =
∑
v∈S c(v).
One can represent this dummy game by associating to G the CSG game Γ
as follows: Sk = V , (i.e. skills correspond to agents). For every v ∈ V we
define w(v) = c(v). Finally T = V . This yields a skill-based representation
ψC . Completing this representation by the trivial semivalue induced by β in Γ
yields a β-skill-based centrality measure which (by Lemma 1) is easily seen to
be equivalent to c.
Example 2. [Degree centrality:] Consider a graph G = (V,E). We associate
to G a game Γ as follows: skills correspond to edges of G. A node of G has a
skill e iff it is incident with e. Tasks correspond to edges as well.
Sometimes, as the following example shows, the ”natural” representation of
centralities using CSG is inefficient, as the number of tasks may be exponential
in the size of graph G.
Example 3. [Betweenness centrality]: Consider a graph G = (V,E). As-
sociate to G a game Γ as follows: skills correspond to edges of G. A node of
G has a skill e iff it is incident with the corresponding edge. Tasks correspond
to shortest paths connecting two nodes, say z1, z2 in G. Such a task has weight
equal to the inverse of the number of shortest paths between z1, z2. The trivial
skill-based centrality measure coincides with (ordinary) betweenness centrality.
3.1 Limitations of (Rational) Network Centralities.
In Theorem 1 we were, in some sense, ”cheating”, as the values of network
centrality were built in the weights the dummy game representing the measure.
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In particular this game depended on the graph G, not only on n, the num-
ber of vertices. It is natural to ask whether universality fails once we impose
some further restrictions on the framework that precludes such ”pathological”
representations.
In the sequel we study an interesting and natural restriction on characteristic
functions and centrality measures: that they are ”rational functions of the graph
topology”, i.e. a quotient of two polynomials. We formalize this idea as follows:
Given a set of vertices V , denote by En(V ) the set of subsets w = {v1, v2} of
distinct vertices in V . Associate to every w ∈ En(V ) a boolean variable Xw.
We can interpret the set E of edges of any graph G on V as a 0/1 assignment
(Xw)w∈En(V ) ∈ {0, 1}En(V ), Xw = 1 if w ∈ E, Xw = 0, otherwise. By forcing
notation we will write E instead of (Xw)w∈En(V ) ∈ {0, 1}En(V ). We do similarly
for vertices, identifying a vertex i with a boolean variable Yv. This way we can
specify a set of vertices S by a boolean vector, corresponding to those vertices
v with Yv = 1.
Definition 1. A family of characteristic functions (vn)n≥1 is called rational if
there exists two families of polynomials Pn(Xe, Yv) and Qn(Xe, Yv) ∈ Q[X,Y ]
such that for every n ≥ 1 and S ⊆ [n]
vn(S) =
Pn[E,S]
Qn[E,S]
(2)
Example 4. For every S ⊆ [n] characteristic functions vS are rational. Indeed
vS(·) =
∏
i∈S Yi.
Example 5. Characteristic function v∗ in the definition of game-theoretic net-
work centrality is rational. Indeed,
v∗(S) =
∑
i∈[n]
Yi +
∑
i∈[n]
(1− Yi)[1−
∏
j 6=i
(1− YjXi,j)]
To see that this equality is true: each i ∈ S contributes 1 to the first sum.
Only i 6∈ S may contribute to the second sum, but only when some term 1−YiXi,j
is equal to zero, that is when there is some j 6= i with Yj = 1 (i.e. j ∈ S) and
Xi,j = 1 (i.e. (i, j) ∈ E).
Definition 2. Let V be a set of vertices. A centrality measure c = (cn)n≥1 is
rational iff there exist multivariate polynomials Pn,v, Qn ∈ Q[X] such that, for
every n ≥ 1, and every graph G = (V,E) on V we have
cn(v,G) =
Pn,v[E]
Qn[E]
(3)
Example 6. Degree centrality is rational. Indeed, one may take Pn,v[X] =∑
e3v
Xe and Qn[X] = 1.
The case of betweenness centrality is more interesting:
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Theorem 2. Betweenness centrality is rational.
Proof. For every set of vertices V , define D to be the family of simple paths
in the complete graph on V . Given P ∈ D, define monomials XP =
∏
e∈P Xe
and X˜P = XP ·
∏
Q∈D
|Q|<|P |
(1−XQ). Also, for vertices z1 6= z2 define Pn,v,z1,z2 [X] =∑
P :z1→v→z2
X˜P , Qz1,z2 [X] =
∑
P :z1→z2
X˜P . With these notations, we claim that we
have the following formula
BCn[v] =
∑
v1 6=v2∈V
Pn,v,z1,z2 [X]
Qz1,z2 [X]
(4)
To prove equation (4) we first show that
Claim 1. Given graph G = (V,E), X˜P = 1 iff P is a shortest path in G.
Proof. X˜P = 1 iff XP = 1 and for all Q ∈ D, |Q| < |P |, XQ = 0, that is Q is
not a path in G.
Applying Claim 1 we infer that Pn,v,z1,z2 count shortest paths between z1, z2
passing through v and Qz1,z2 counts all shortest paths between z1, z2.
The following two theorems show that the family of rational centrality mea-
sures is reasonably comprehensive:
Theorem 3. Every centrality measure induced by a rational family of charac-
teristic functions is rational.
Proof. From the marginal contribution formula for the Shapley value.
Corollary 1. Game-theoretic network centrality [28] is a rational centrality
measure.
Corollary 2. If vn is a family of characteristic functions whose Harsanyi divi-
dends are rational numbers then the family of centrality measures induced by vn
is rational.
Proof. From Exp. 4 and the fact that linear combinations of rational functions
with coefficients in Q are rational.
Theorem 4. Every centrality measure induced by a family of CSG with constant
coefficients in Q is rational.
Theorem 4 connects rationality to the representation of centrality by CSG,
essentially showing that when we disallow adaptive representations like those
used in the proof of Theorem 1 induced centrality measures are indeed rational.
Despite these two results, rational measures are not universal; they fail to
capture a natural centrality measure:
Theorem 5. Eigenvector centrality is not rational.
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Proof. Consider the graph G from Figure 2 (a). Simple computations show that
eigenvector centrality values of node 1, 3 are equal to 1√
2+1
and that of 2 is equal
to
√
2√
2+1
. In particular the eigenvector centrality of 1, 3 is an irrational num-
ber. But this would be impossible if the eigenvector centrality were a rational
centrality measure.
It would be interesting to define an extension of the family of rational cen-
tralities that captures all ”natural” centralities.
4 Parameterized Complexity of Computing Skill-
Based Centralities.
Since computing the Shapley value of CSG is #P -complete [29], it follows that
computing skill-based centralities is intractable in general. On the other hand,
by imposing a natural restriction on the family of CSG games under considera-
tion, that of an existence of an upper bound on the largest set of skills needed
for a task, we get a fixed-parameter tractable class of algorithms:
Theorem 6. Let β be a poly-time computable family of semivalues. The fol-
lowing problem
- [INPUT:] A CSG Γ = (N, v) and a player i ∈ N .
- [TO COMPUTE:] Semivalue Φβi (v).
parameterized by k, the cardinality of the largest skill set required by any task,
is fixed parameter tractable.
5 An Application: Helping Centralities.
In this section we give an application of the idea of representing network cen-
tralities by CSG. [30] have recently defined (using different ideas) a centrality
measure that quantifies the extent to which a given agent adds value to a group.
On the other hand, an agent may be valuable to a group even when it lacks the
skills to contribute to completing a given task, provided it is capable to enlist
neighbors with such skills.
Example 7. Members of the program committee for computer science confer-
ences often use subreviewers to referee papers. Each paper needs to receive a
minimal number (say three) of reviews. A PC member may lack the skill to
competently review the paper itself. But the ability it may have to help the re-
viewing process by enlisting subreviewers with the required reviewing skills, in
order to complete the task of getting three reviews for the given paper, is highly
valuable.
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Example 8. Consider again the coalitional game-theoretic framework for the
WTC 9/11 terrorist network in Example 1. Nodes 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16 could have
assembled an attacking team consisting of (some of) their neighbors. In the case
of node 16 (N. Alhazmi) this happens despite not being known to have had any
of the two required skills P,M . Because of this fact, node 16 intuitively can
”help” all non-winning coalitions (which may already include it !) by enlisting
its neighbors. This is intuitively, not true for nodes 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13 : they do
not ”help” those coalitions that were already turned into winning coalitions by
their mere joining. Neither do any other nodes in the network. So, intuitively,
node 16 should be the ”most helping” node.
It turns out that properly defining such a centrality notion is somewhat
subtle and may not have a single, always best solution. The following could be
the natural first idea:
Definition 3. Given coalitional game Γ and graph G, we define the centrality
extension of Γ on graph G as the game Γ1 with value function vcen(S) = v(S ∪
N(S)).
Example 9. Consider the dummy game v(S) = |S|. Then for every graph G
the Shapley value of the centrality extension vcen(S) of v on graph G is exactly
the game-theoretic centrality of G [2].
Since we want to disentangle a player’s capability to help solve tasks itself
from its capability to get help from its neighbors, defining helping centrality
would require subtracting the Shapley value of v from the Shapley value of its
centrality extension vcen. However, this is problematic: since v(N) = vcen(N)
and the Shapley values of vcen, v add up to v(N), quantity Sh[vcen](i)−Sh[v](i)
will be negative for some players i (unless Sh[v] = Sh[vcen], in which case the
centrality would be identically zero) !
A variation of this approach works, however, sometimes: instead of sub-
tracting Sh[v], only subtract a ”scaled down” version of this quantity. That is,
define helping centrality as (a multiple of) Sh[vcen]− αSh[v] for some suitable
α ∈ (0, 1). An appropriate choice seems to be the following
Definition 4. For CSG game Γ on graph G define
∆∗ = max
t∈T
s∈Tt
{|N(C) \ C| : C ⊆ P (s), |C| = ns − ks,t + 1}
where ns is the number of players having skill s and ks,t is the number of copies
of skill s needed to accomplish task t.
Note that ∆∗ = ∆ in games where ns = ks,t for every task t ∈ T and s ∈ Tt,
in particular for games where each skill is possessed by a single player.
Definition 5. Define the Shapley-based helping centrality of a node x ∈ V in a
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game Γ = (N, v) on graph G by
HC(x) = (1 +
1
∆∗
)[Sh[vcen](x)− Sh[v](x)
∆∗ + 1
] =
= (1 +
1
∆∗
)Sh[vcen](x)− 1
∆∗
Sh[v](x) (5)
This definition is sensible in at least the following three settings (Theorem 10,
stated later, offers yet another one):
Theorem 7. Consider a CSG game Γ = (V, v) in which every player x possesses
at most one skill. Then for every player x, HC(x) ≥ 0 and ∑
y∈V
HC(y) = 1.
In the next two examples each skill is unique to some player:
Example 10. Let G = Sn be the star graph with n vertices (Figure 2 (b)) and
let S = {2, 3, . . . , n}. Then
vcen,S(T ) =
{
1, if {2, 3, . . . n} ⊆ T or 1 ∈ T,
0, if otherwise.
Simple computations yield Sh[vS ](1) = 0, Sh[vS ](i) = 1/(n− 1) for i = 2, . . . n.
Also Sh[vcen,S ](1) = 1− 1n , Sh[vcen,S ](i) = 1n(n−1) for i = 2, . . . n. In conclusion
HC(1) = 1, HC(i) = 0, for i = 2, . . . n. Node 1 is the only one that has positive
helping centrality, despite being a null player ! Also, sensibly, the helping cen-
trality of all other nodes is zero, as their only neighbor is 1 which is not in the
coalition S, so they cannot help.
Example 11. In the setting of Example 9, the Shapley value of node x has the
formula [28] Sh[v](x) =
∑
y∈Nˆ(x)
1
deg(y)+1 . Hence HC(x) = (1+
1
∆ )[
∑
y∈Nˆ(x)
1
deg(y)+1−
1
∆+1 ], which is ≥ 0, since x ∈ Nˆ(x) and deg(x) ≤ ∆.
However, it is not clear that, as defined, HC[v](x) is nonnegative in all CSG.
This motivates giving a second definition, which departs from the idea of giving
a notion of helping centrality based on the Shapley value:
Definition 6. Given coalitional game Γ and graph G, we define the Helping
Shapley value of a player x by HSh[v](x) = 1n! ·
∑
pi∈Sn [v(S
x
pi ∪ {x} ∪ N(x)) −
v(Sxpi)], where S
x
pi = {pi[i]|pi[i] precedes x in pi}. The helping centrality of player
x is defined as
Help(x) = HSh[v](x)− Sh[v](x) =
=
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
[v(Sxpi ∪ {x} ∪N(x))− v(Sxpi ∪ {x})]. (6)
Note that if game Γ is monotonically increasing then v(Sxpi ∪ {x} ∪ N(x)) −
v(Sxpi ∪ {x}) ≥ 0. When the sign is strictly positive say that x helps ordered
coalition Sxpi . Finally, by performing appropriate divisions we also consider the
normalized versions H˜Sh and H˜elp.
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Figure 2: (a). Graph P2 (b). Star graph S7.
Example 12. Let G = P2 be the graph in Figure 2, and Γ be the T -veto game
corresponding to coalition T = {1, 3}. That is v{1,3}(S) =
{
1, if {1, 3} ⊂ S,
0, if otherwise.
Considering the permutations in S3 in the order (1, 2, 3), (1, 3, 2), (2, 1, 3),
(2, 3, 1), (3, 1, 2), (3, 2, 1), simple computations show that HSh[v{1,3}](1) =
1
6 (0 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 1) =
1
2 , HSh[v{1,3}](2) =
1
6 (1 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 1) =
2
3 ,
HSh[v{1,3}](3) = 16 (1 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0) =
1
2 . As for helping central-
ities, we have Sh[v{1,3}](1) = Sh[v{1,3}](3) = 12 and Sh[v{1,3}](2) = 0, so
Help(1) = Help(3) = 0, and Help(2) = 2/3. Node 2 is the only one that
has positive helping centrality, despite being a null player !
A potential disadvantage of measures HSh and Help is that they do not
have easy interpretations in terms of classical notions of coalitional game the-
ory. On the other hand, they have exact formulas somewhat reminiscent of the
corresponding formula (1) for the Shapley value:
Theorem 8. Given game Γ = (N, v) with veto decomposition v =
∑
S aSvS,
graph G = (N,E), i ∈ N and S ⊆ N denote by NC(i, S) the set of nodes
in S \ Nˆ(i) and by Cov(i, S) = S ∩ Nˆ(i). Then HSh[v](i) = ∑
∅6=S
i∈S
aS
|NC(i,S)|+1 +∑
∅6=S
i∈N(S)\S
aS
|NC(i,S)|+1 [1− 1|Cov(i,S)| ] and Help(i) =
∑
∅6=S
i∈S
aS(|Cov(i,S)|−1)
|S|(|NC(i,S)|+1) +
∑
∅6=S
i∈N(S)\S
aS [|Cov(i,S)|−1]
(|NC(i,S)|+1)|Cov(i,S)| .
Unfortunately a formula similar to (1) for Sh[vcen] (and ultimately forHC[v])
seems hard to obtain. The reason is that in order to compute Sh[vcen] we would
need to compute the Shapley values of games of type
vcen,S(T ) =
{
1, if S ⊂ T ∪N(T ),
0, if otherwise.
Doing this requires computing the probability that a random set of vertices
is a vertex cover, which seems infeasible. This shows another problem of the
Shapley-based helping centrality.
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5.1 Helping Centralities in Terrorist NetworksSome de-
tails on the (simple) computations substantiating our
claims in this section are given as Supplemental Ma-
terial.
We next apply our helping centrality measures to the terrorist network in Fig-
ure 1. We could estimate helping centralities using sampling techniques similar
to those for the Shapley value, but in this case of the 9/11 network exact com-
putations are actually feasible. To reduce overhead, call two nodes equivalent
iff (a). They have the same set of skills (b). The families of multisets of skills of
their neighbors are identical as multisets. For Figure 1 this relation splits V into
the following equivalence classes: {1, 19}, {2}, {3, 15}, {18}, {17}, {4, 11}, {5},
{16}, {14}, {13}, {9, 12}, {6, 8, 10}, {7}. It is easy to see that equivalent nodes
have identical Helping and Shapley-Based Helping Centralities. Nodes 2 helps
no ordered coalitions, hence Help(2) = 0. At the other extreme, 16 has the
highest normalized helping centrality, 0.126117. The complete node ordering by
decreasing Helping Centrality is 16 > 13 > {7, 9, 12} > {6, 8, 10, 11, 4} > 5 >
{3, 14, 15} > {1, 19} > {17, 18} > 2.
As for the Shapley-Based Helping Centrality, the 9/11 Network falls within
the scope of Theorem 7. ∆∗ = 11, as witnessed by the coalition C of M nodes
except 11. Again 16 has the highest value, HC(16) = 0.118687, while the
order by decreasing HC is 16 > 13 > {7, 9, 12} > {6, 8, 10, 11} > 4 > 5 >
{3, 14, 15, 1, 19} > {17, 18, 2}. Both measures identify node 16 as the most help-
ful, with comparable centralities, and give quite similar orderings (an interesting
fact, since the two measures were fairly different). The ordering produced by
Help seems slightly more discriminating.
6 Complexity of Helping Centralities.
As expected, computing helping centralities for arbitrary CSG is computation-
ally intractable:
Theorem 9. The following problems are #P -complete:
- [INPUT:] Graph G, CSG Γ, and player x ∈ N .
- [COMPUTE:] (a). The Helping Shapley value HSh[v](x). (b). The
Shapley-based helping centrality HC(x) of node x.
6.1 A Tractable Special Case: Pure Skill Games
In the sequel we highlight a special class of CSG for which computing helping
centralities is tractable.
Definition 7. A pure skill game is a CSG where, for every t ∈ T , |Tt| = 1
(every task presumes a single skill).
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Theorem 10. For pure skill games v and player x ∈ V
HC(x) =
∑
t∈TNˆ(x)
wt
(∆∗ + 1)|P (t)| − |P (t) ∪N(P (t))|
∆∗|P (t)||P (t) ∪N(P (t))|
Help(x) =
∑
t∈Tx
wt
|P (t)|(|P (t)|+ 1)
We have denoted by P (t) the set of players that have the unique skill needed to
complete task t. Consequently, both quantities Help(x) and HC(x) are ≥ 0 for
all players x.
7 Axioms for Helping Centralities.
The Shapley value has a nice axiomatic characterization [31]. The axiomatic
approach to characterizing various coalitional measures has developed into an
important direction in coalitional game theory, and has recently been adapted to
centrality measures as well. A natural question is whether our Helping Shapley
value has a similar axiomatic characterization.
To attempt such a characterization we define a number of properties remi-
niscent of the axiomatic characterization of the ordinary Shapley value:
Definition 8. Given graph G = (V,E), a function f : Γ[V ]→ RV satisfies the
axioms of
- linearity if for every player x ∈ V and any two games v1, v2 on V ,
f [v1 + v2](x) = f [v1](x) + f [v2](x) and, for every α ∈ R, f [αv1](x) =
α · f [v1](x).
- null helping if for every game v on V and i ∈ V s.t. for every S ⊆ V ,
v(S ∪ {i} ∪N(i)) = v(S) then f [v](i) = 0.
- veto game symmetry if for any veto game vS and players x, y , f [vS ](x), f [vS ](y) >
0⇒ f [vS ](x) = f [vS ](y).
Theorem 11. The Helping Shapley value satisfies the linearity and null helping
axioms.
Unfortunately while the Shapley value satisfies veto game symmetry, this is
not true for the Helping Shapley value:
Example 13. Consider the star network Sn in figure 2 (b). Then in the una-
nimity game vN on Sn (corresponding to S = {1, 2, . . . , n}) we have HSh[vS ](1) =
1 > 0, HSh[vS ](i) =
1
n−1 > 0 for all i = 2, . . . , n. Indeed, node i ≥ 2 is pivotal
for pi iff all other nodes in S \ {1, i} appear before i in pi. This happens with
probability 1/(n− 1).
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This mismatch has implications for the axiomatic characterization of the
Helping Shapley value: for the ordinary Shapley value its uniqueness amounts
to establishing veto game symmetry, which normally follows from an equal treat-
ment axiom. The lack of veto symmetry means that we cannot adapt the clas-
sical proof of the Uniqueness of the Shapley value to the Helping Shapley value,
but we only have the following weaker version:
Theorem 12. The Helping Shapley value HSh is the only function f that
satisfies linearity and f [vS ] = HSh[vS ] for all veto games vS.
8 Related work2
Our work combines several important lines of research: the extensive literature
on (game-theoretic) centrality measures (see [1, 8] for reviews from different
perspectives) and that on compact representation frameworks for cooperative
games [15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Through our Theorem 12 we connect to the growing
literature on the axiomatic characterization of values and centrality measures
(for a recent example see [14]).
Ideas related to the use of compact representations in defining notions of
network centrality have been considered (implicitly or explicitly) in previous
literature, e.g. [12, 14]. This last paper is, perhaps, the closest in spirit to our
approach. They undertake a comprehensive study of classes of network centrali-
ties and identify axiomatic foundations for various representational frameworks.
Compared to this work our focus is, however, different: we strive to include ca-
pabilities/tasks explicitly into the representational framework, and identify one
framework which does just that.
Finally, a related problem (but with different technical concerns) is team
formation in the knowledge discovery literature [32, 33].
9 Conclusions, Further Work, Open Problems.
Our work provides two important conceptual contributions:
(1). Giving an explicit framework for representing capabilities to perform tasks
in measures of network centrality, and
(2). Proposing the new notion(s) of helping centrality. We have given two
such measures, which perform similarly on the 9/11 network. Helping
Centrality seems to be slightly more discriminating (and has sometimes
exact formulas) but seems to lack ”nice” axiomatizations.
Several open issues arise: first of all, we have only used one of the several for-
malisms for CSG games. A more extensive investigation of the representational
power of (other) families would be in order. So would the computational and
2For reasons of space this section gives only minimal pointers to the existing literature; a
comprehensive treatment is deferred to the full (journal) version.
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experimental aspects of helping centralities. The problem of defining represen-
tational formalisms that are able to naturally model all ”reasonable” centrality
measures is, we feel, an interesting one. Finally, note that Helping Centrality
is missing from the list of #P -complete results of Theorem 9. We leave its
complexity open.
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Supplemental Material
In this manuscript we give some extra details on the proofs omitted from the
main document:
10 Proof of Theorem 4
We will use the decomposition of coalitional skill games by linearity to reduce
the problem to reasoning about simple skill games, i.e. CSG consisting of a
single task t of unit profit. In this setting a coalition S is called winning if it
can accomplish task t and losing otherwise. Define by W (t) the set of minimal
winning coalitions for task t, i.e. of subsets A such that v(A) = 1 and v(B) = 0
for any strict subset B of A.
Then the polynomial
1−
∏
A∈W (t)
(1−
∏
r∈A
Yr)
is equal to 1 precisely when for some A ∈ W (t) we have Yr = 1 for all r ∈ A.
Hence, denoting S = {r : Yr = 1}, we have
v(S) = 1−
∏
A∈W (t)
(1−
∏
r∈A
Yr)
11 Proof of Theorem 6
We will again use the decomposition of coalitional skill games by linearity to
reduce the problem to reasoning about simple skill games.
Clearly Φβi can be computed by estimating, for k = 0, . . . , n − 1 quantities
EC∈Ck [MC(C, i)]. Nonzero marginal contributions arise from ordered coalitions
C ∈ Ck such that
(1). i is the last element of C.
(2). C is winning.
(3). C \ {i} is not winning.
For every task Tj (identified with a multiset of skills) denote by T ∗j the set of
submultisets of Tj . For T ∈ T ∗j and 1 ≤ r ≤ n−1 denote by niT,r the number of
ordered coalitions X of size exactly r and not containing i such that SX∩Tj = T .
Denote Wi,j = Ci ∩ Tj the set of skills of agent i that can contribute towards
completing task j. An ordered coalition satisfies properties (1)-(3) above if and
only if Tj \Wi,j ⊆ SC\{i} ( Tj . Thus
Φβi =
n−1∑
r=0
β(r)
[ ∑
Tj\Wi,j⊆T(Tj
(n− r − 1)!
n!
· niT,r
]
. (7)
19
We use a dynamic programming approach to compute parameters niT,r. The
table has at most 2k columns, each corresponding to a submultiset of Tj . Rows of
the table correspond to pairs (r, s), where r ≤ s ≤ n. The element on row (r, s)
and T , denoted by niT,r,s, counts ordered coalitions X of size r not containing
element i, formed with elements from a1, a2, . . . , as, such that SX ∩ Tj = T .
Clearly niT,r = n
i
T,r,n.
We start the table by filling in rows (r, s) = (0, 0) and (r, s) = (1, 1). Clearly,
niT,0,k = 0 for all k ≥ 1 and T ⊆ Tj , and niT,1,1 equals the number of players
k 6= i such that Sk ∩ Tj = T . Thus rows (0, 0) and (1, 1) can be completed by
simple player inspection.
Now, coalitions X of size r not containing element i with elements from the
set a1, a2, . . . as such that SX ∩ Tj = T decompose into two types:
- Coalitions not containing as. Their number is counted by n
i
T,r,s−1.
- Coalitions containing as. Let Y = X \ as, D = SY ∩ Tj , D ⊆ T ,E =
Sas ∩ Tj . It follows that D ∪ E = T. Thus we get recurrence niT,r,s =
niT,r,s−1 +
∑
D∪(Ss∩Tj)=T
niD,r−1,s−1. This equation allows us to fill row
(r, s) from rows (r, s−1) and (r−1, s−1), ultimately allowing to compute
parameters niT,r for all i.
It is easily seen that the complexity of the provided algorithm is O(2k ·
poly(|Γ|)). Thus the problem is fixed parameter tractable.
12 Proof of Theorem 7
By additivity it is enough to assume that Γ is a single-task game.
We will investigate quantity
[v[Sxpi ∪ {x} ∪N(v(Sxpi ∪ {x})]− v(Sxpi ∪N(Sxpi))]−
− 1
∆∗ + 1
· (v(Sxpi ∪ {x})− v(Sxpi)). (8)
The average of this quantity over all permutations pi ∈ Sn yields HC(x).
Further define, for A ⊆ V ,
h(A) := v(A ∪N(A))− 1
∆∗ + 1
· v(A). (9)
Quantity in Equation (8) is, of course, nothing but h(Sxpi ∪{x})−h(Sxpi), and
HC(x) = Epi∈Sn [h(S
x
pi ∪ {x})− h(Sxpi)] (10)
Case A: v(A) = 0. Then h(A) = 0 iff v(A ∪ N(A)) = 0, h(A) = 1,
otherwise.
Case B: v(A) = 1. Then h(A) = ∆
∗
∆∗+1 .
In conclusion:
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1. When v(A) = 1 we also have v(A ∪ {x}) = 1, hence h(A ∪ {x}) = h(A) =
∆∗
∆∗+1 and h(A ∪ {x})− h(A) = 0.
2. If v(A∪{x}) = 0 and v(A∪{x}∪N(A∪{x})) = 0, then h(A∪{x})−h(A) =
0.
3. If v(A∪ {x}) = 0 and v(A∪ {x} ∪N(A∪ {x})) = 1 but v(A∪N(A)) = 0,
then h(A ∪ {x})− h(A) = 1.
4. If v(A ∪ {x}) = 1 and v(A ∪N(A)) = 0 then h(A ∪ {x})− h(A) = ∆∗∆∗+1 .
5. The only case when h(A∪{x})−h(A) is negative is when v(A∪N(A)) =
v(A ∪ {x}) = 1, v(A) = 0, in which case h(A ∪ {x})− h(A) = − 1∆∗+1 .
To compute HC(x) one averages (over all pi ∈ Sn) both positive and negative
terms of type h(Sxpi ∪ {x})− h(Sxpi).
If x has no skill useful to the unique task t then Case 5 cannot happen (since
condition v(A ∪ {x}) = 1, v(A) = 0 is impossible), and we are done.
In the opposite situation, suppose x has the useful skill s. To prove that
HC(x) ≥ 0 it is enough to compare the contribution of positive terms (Cases
3,4 in the previous enumeration) with that of negative terms (Case 5). It turns
out that we will only need to compare contributions from Cases 4 and 5.
In both cases 4 and 5, as v(Sxpi ∪ {x}) = 1, v(Sxpi) = 0 and x adds one more
skill to Sxpi , x must add precisely the unique copy of skill s that S
x
pi is missing to
complete task t.
Since v(Sxpi∪{x}) = 1, v(Sxpi) = 0, in both cases x must be the ks,t’th element
with skill s in pi. The difference between Cases 4 and 5 is, therefore, whether
v(Sxpi ∪ N(Sxpi) = 1, that is whether some node in Sxpi is adjacent (or not) to a
node with skill s in V \ Sxpi .
Let’s condition on (V \ (Sxpi) ∩ P (s) being equal to a fixed set C (of size
ns − ks + 1) and compare the contributions of permutations falling in Cases 4
and 5 to HC[x].
It is easy to see that v(Sxpi ∪N(Sxpi)) = 1 iff some node in Sxpi is adjacent to
some node in C, i.e. if Sxpi contains some node in N(C) \ C.
In other words, we are in Case 4 iff C ∪ N(C) ⊆ V \ Sxpi , i.e. when x is
the first element in {x} ∪N(C) \C. This happens with probability 1|N(C)\C|+1 .
The contribution of permutations pi with Sxpi falling in Case 4 to the sum is
∆∗
(∆∗+1)(|N(C)∪C|+1) .
As for case 5, we are in that case with conditional probability |N(C)\C||N(C)\C|+1 .
The contribution of permutations pi with Sxpi falling in Case 5 to the sum is
− |N(C)\C|(∆∗+1)(|N(C)\C|+1) .
The difference in contributions is 1(∆∗+1)(|N(C)\C|+1) ·[∆∗−|N(C)\C|], which
is ≥ 0 by the definition of ∆∗.
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13 Proof of Theorem 8
By the linear decomposition of games as combination of veto games, we only
need to compute the Helping Shapley value of i for the S-veto game vS . Clearly,
if i 6∈ S∪N(S), then HSh[vS ](i) = 0. Indeed, in this case i can help no coalition
T contain S, since Nˆ(i) ∩ S = ∅). So we concentrate on the case i ∈ S ∪N(S).
There are two subcases:
- i ∈ S. Then i is pivotal iff all elements of NC(i, S) appear before i in pi.
The probability of this happening is 1|NC(i,S)|+1 .
- i ∈ N(S) \ S. Then i is pivotal iff all elements of NC(i, S) appear before
i in pi and some element of S ∩N(i) appears after i in pi. That is
(a). all elements of NC(i, S) apppear before i in pi (an event which
happens with probability 1/(|NC(i, S)| + 1)), but it is not the case
that
(b). i is the last element of S ∩ N(i) in pi. Events (a), (b) are in-
dependent, since they refer to sets (NC(i, S), S ∩ N(i) that do not
intersect), and the probability of (b) happening is 1/|Cov(i, S)|.
To derive the second formula we simply use the formula for the Shapley
value.
14 Proof of Theorem 9
Since computing the Shapley value of an arbitrary CSG is #P -complete [29],
the result follows by chosing G = (V, ∅), the empty graph on V . In such a
case v(S) = vcen(S) for every S ⊆ V . Also Sh[v](x) = HSh[v](x), HC(x) =
Sh[v](x) · (1− 1∆+1 ).
15 Proof of Theorem 10
Decomposing again the game v into a weighted combination of single task games,
we reduce the proof of the formulas to the setting when the game is a such a
game.
A coalition S satisfies vcen(S) = 1 iff v(S ∪ N(S)) = 1. We infer that
x is pivotal to coalition S under vcen iff v(S ∪ {x} ∪ N(S ∪ {x}) = 1 , but
v(S ∪ N(S)) = 0. Because the game is a pure skill game, these conditions are
equivalent to requiring that x or some node in N(x) can perform task t, but
nodes in S cannot. In other words x is the first node in permutation pi from the
set P (t) ∪N(P (t)).
Given this argument, the first proof is simple: The probability that in a
random permutation x is the first player among those in P (t) ∪ N(P (t)) is
1/|P (t) ∪ N(P (t))|. A similar computation works for computing the Shapley
22
value of v, establishing the formula for HC[v](x). Note that, since |P (t) ∪
N(P (t))| ≤ (∆ + 1)|P (t)|, HC[v](x) ≥ 0.
As for the second proof, for x to be pivotal to HSh[v], none of the elements
before x in pi must be in T , while x must be in T ∪N(T ). There are two cases:
- x ∈ P (t), i.e. t ∈ Tx. Then x must be the first element of P (t) in
permutation pi. In a random permutation this happens with probability
1/|P (t)|.
- x ∈ N(P (t)) \ P (t), i.e. t ∈ TNˆ(x) \ Tx. Then x must be the first element
from {x}∪P (t) in permutation pi. In a random permutation this happens
with probability 1/(|P (t)|+ 1).
The computation of the Shapley value is equally simple, and uses similar prob-
abilistic arguments.
16 Proof of Theorem 11
A couple of straightforward verifications.
17 Proof of Theorem 12
Recall [21] that any characteristic function can be written as a linear combi-
nation of the characteristic functions vS of all 2
n − 1 nontrivial S-veto games,
Γ =
∑
S 6=∅
aSvS .
Now we apply linearity and we infer that
f [Γ] = f [
∑
S 6=∅
aSvS ] =
∑
S 6=∅
aSf [vS ] =
∑
S 6=∅
aSHSh[vS ]
Plugging in the explicit formula for HSh[vS ] we immediately infer that f [Γ] =
HSh[Γ].
18 Helping Centralities in the 9/11 Terrorist Net-
work: Some Details
We have implemented a simple Python script calcShapley.py for computing
measures Help and HC (see the details on it in the next section).
The (raw) results are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
19 Details on the Python script calcShapley.py
The input is read from a file and has the following structure:
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Table 1: (Unnormalized) Helping Centralities.
Nodes Help
16 0.279120879121
13 0.234188034188
7,9,12 0.2
6,8,10,11,4 0.123076923077
5 0.0888888
3,14,15 0.0791208791209
1,19 0.0449328449328
17,18 0.034188034188
2 0
Table 2: Shapley-Based Helping Centralities.
Nodes HC
16 0.118687
13 0.113248
7,9,12 0.108198
6,8,10,11 0.052642
4 0.049077
5 0.044026
3,14,15,1,19 0.019514
17,18,2 0.014075
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- On the first line there are 4 values: the number of terrorists, martial
artists, pilots and edges in the network. The values are given in this order
- The second line names which nodes are martial artists
- The third line names which nodes are pilots
- The fourth line contains the number of pilots and the number of martial
artists required to complete the attack
- The next lines, to the end of the file, contain two integers x and y repre-
senting an undirected edge between nodes x and y
Following the input phase we construct a list ”fact” to hold the factorials of
numbers from 0 to 19. Afterwards we can proceed with the actual computation.
The idea is to count how many coalition a certain node can help. We use
backtracking to generate all unordered coalitions. If a coalition doesn’t contain
at least one pilot and two martial artists, we iterate through all 19 terrorists
to see who could help this coalition achieve its goals. We perform three checks
for all terrorists: does the coalition win if terrorist x joins it? Does it win if x
joins with his neighbors? If the coalition with its neighbors doesn’t win, does
it win if x and his neighbors join? For the questions answered by yes, we count
in the number of ordered coalitions helped in a certain way by x. To get the
number of ordered coalitions from the unordered ones, we need to count all
permutations that begin with the coalition in question, continue with terrorist
x, and end with the rest of the terrorists that are not x and not in the coalition.
To get this number, we multiply the factorial of the size of the coalition with the
factorial of the remaining terrorists. From these counts we can then compute
the Shapley value and the HC and Help indices introduced in the paper. The
function ”iterate” recursively generates all combinations in a list ”coalition”,
which contains 20 values of 0 or 1 representing for each terrorist whether he’s
in the coalition or not. In other words, if coalition[x] is 1, then x is in the
current coalition. For each coalition and each terrorist x the check functions are
called: checkshapley, checkhelp and checkvcen. These functions construct the
coalition extended with x in the appropriate way according to the logic described
above. The counts are held in the respective variables scoreshapley, scorehelp
and scorevcen. Intuitively, the Shapley value for the game v is retrieved by
dividing scoreshapley with the total number of coalitions (19!). The Shapley
value in vcen is retrieved similarly by dividing scorevcen with 19!. Using these
values we can compute the HC and Help indices described in the paper using
their respective formulas. In the end, the print all function is called. We print
the Shapley, HC and Help values for each terrorist. The last three printed lines
contain for each value concept the sum of values of all terrorists, verifying that
the Shapley and HC values sum up to 1, whereas Help does not.
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